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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a denial of a Petition for 
Writ of Error, construed by the trial court as a Wnt 
of Habeas Corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On May 26, 1966, appellant filed a Petition for 
Writ of Error in the District Court of Salt Lake Coun-
ty, State of Utah (R. 3). A hearing was held on the 
22nd day of June, 1966, before the Honorable Mar-
cellus K. Snow, Judge. The trial court construed ap-
pellant's Petition for Writ of Error as a Petition for 
Habeas Corpus and denied the same. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits the decision of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 2, 1961, the appellant was convicted 
of second degree burglary, and then, pursuant to 
the second part of the same information, was found 
to be a habitual criminal (R. 9). Appellant was sen-
tenced consecutively for the offenses of burglary in 
the second degree and of being a habitual criminal 
and subsequently, said sentences were made to f'..m 
concurrently by the Utah State Board of Pardons 
(R. 9). 
The trial court found, as a matter of law, that (1) 
the petition did not state a cause of action, and (2) 
the sentence received on both counts of the informa-
tion was legal and proper (R. 9). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ISSUE PRESENTED BY APPELLANT IN 
THIS APPEAL IS RES JUDICATA. 
In this proceeding, appellant does not challenge 
the substantive merits of his conviction of burglar~· 
in the second degree or the finding that appellant 
had attained the status of a habitual criminal. 
Rather, appellant merely challenges the procedure 
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employed by the trial court in sentencing him after 
the unassailed jury verdicts were returned. 
In discussing Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(f) (1), this court, 
in Burleigh v. Turner. 15 Utah 2d 118, 388 P.2d 412 
0964), stated at 15 Utah 2d 120, 388 P.2d 414: 
Habeas corpus is a civil remedy and should, there-
fore, generally be governed by our rules of civil pro-
cedure. That the doctrine of res judicata is applicable 
to habeas corpus proceedings is supported by Rule 
65B(f) wherein a petitioner must allege, among 
other things, that the legality of the imprisonment 
has not been adjudged upon a prior proceedings .... 
The obvious purpose of this rule is to discourage suc-
cessive applications based upon the same grounds 
and that the courts need not entertain them. 
Appellant has appeared before this court on 
habeas corpus proceedings on three prior occa-
sions. The language employed by this court in de-
termining appellant's prior contentions establish 
this court's awareness of the sentencing procedure 
employed by the trial court and ratification of that 
sentence. As stated in Clark v. Turner. 15 Utah 2d 
83, 387 P.2d 557 (1963), at 15 Utah 2d 84, 387 P.2d 557: 
Charged with the crime of burglary and with being 
an habitual criminal, he [appellant] was tried by 
jury, convicted on both counts, and sentenced to the 
statutory terms of one to twenty years for the burg-
lary and for not less than fifteen years on the habitual 
criminal count. No appeal was taken. 
This court, in Clark v. Turner. 16 Utah 2d 197, 
398 P.2d 202 (1965), also noted the sentences im-
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posed on the appellant by the trial court and the:1 
stated at 16 Utah 2d 198, 398 P.2d 203: 
We believe and hold that plaintiff [appellant] failed 
to s~stain the on~s of showing any facts justifying 
the issuance of this extraordinary writ. 
Also, it is the Utah rule that not only issues tha! 
are tried, but issues that should have been tried, i.e. 
triable issues, will be baned if not prosecuted at the 
first opportunity. Wheadon v. Pearson. 14 Utah 2d 
45, 376 P.2d 946 (1963); East Mill Creek Water Co. v. 
Salt Lake City. 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 863 (1945). 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
issue of the sentences imposed on the appellant by 
the trial court and which now constitutes the sub-
stance of this appeal is res judicata. 
POINT II 
THE SENTENCES IMPOSED BY THE TRIAL 
COURT VIOLATED NO CONSTITUTIONALLY PRO-
TECTED RIGHT OF THE APPELLANT. 
It must be emphasized that appellant presently 
challenges only the sentences imposed by the trial 
court and does not, in any manner, challenge the 
sufficiency or the substantive merits of either the 
conviction on the charge of second degree burglary 
or the finding that appellant is an habitual criminal. 
Therefore. even assuming arguendo that the sen-
tencing procedure employed by the trial court in the 
instant case was erroneous, the status of the matter 
would be anal-3.gous to Folck v. Watson, 102 Utah 
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470, 132 P.2d 130 (1942), wherein this court stated at 
102 Utah 473, 132 P.2d 132: 
Folck [appellant] makes no attack upon any of the 
proceedings had against him except the sentence .... 
He cannot escape serving the sentence provided by 
law merely because the court has erred in pronounc-
ing sentence .... The defect in the sentence does not 
adhere in the judgment of conviction. 
On this basis, the most that can be said of ap-
pellant's present complaint is that as to the second 
degree burglary conviction and the habitual crim-
inal finding, that conviction and finding are valid, 
and appellant's only complaint goes to the sentences 
imposed as a result of that conviction and finding. 
There is no allegation raised by appellant that the 
court did not have jurisdiction over the subject mat-
ter and person of the appellant so as to render a 
valid judgment of conviction against the appellant. 
Appellant alleges a violation of the double 
jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution and also Utah Const. art. 
I § 12. However, the United States Supreme Court, 
in Holiday v. Johnston. 313 U.S. 342 (1941), stated at 
313 U.S. 349: 
The erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single 
offense of which the accused has been convicted or 
as to which he has pleaded guilty, does not constitute 
double jeopardy. 
Also, in Downum v. United States. 372 U.S. 734 
(1963), Justice Douglas stated at 372 U.S. 736: 
6 
Harrassment of an accused by successive prosecutions 
or declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prose-
cution a more favorable opportunity to convict are 
examples when jeopardy attaches .... For the pro-
hibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause is not against 
being twice punished; but against being put twice in 
jeopardy. 
In the instant case, again assuming arguendo 
that the trial court erroneously imposed two sen-
tences on the appellant for the same offense, the 
erroneous imposition of two sentences for a single 
offense does not constitute a violation of the con-
stitutionally protected right against double jeopardy. 
The only remaining question then becomes the 
remedial procedure employed by an accused who 
alleges such an occurrence. As stated in Holiday v. 
Johnston, supra, at 313 U.S. 349: 
His [appellant's) remedy is to apply for vacation of 
the sentence and a resentence in conformity to the 
statute under which he was adjudged guilty. 
In Kahl v. United States, 204 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 
1953), the court stated at 204 F.2d 866: 
However, since Holiday v. Johnston .... the remedy 
for a sentence void in whole or in part is to apply for 
a vacation of the sentence and proper resentence in 
accordance with the statute under which the accused 
is judged guilty. 
Kahl v. United States, supra, was cited with ap· 
proval in Roddy v. United States, 296 F.2d 9 (10th 
Cir. 1961). 
However, should this court determine that 
habeas corpus is a proper procedural vehicle with 
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which to obtain review of an allegedly erroneous 
sentence, the proper course of action is for this 
court to remand the case to the trial court for the 
sentencing in accordance with the statutory require-
ments. Folck v. Watson. supra. See also Lee Lim v. 
Davis. 75 Utah 245, 284 Pac. 323 (1929), wherein the 
court cited with approval State v. Reed, 138 Minn. 
465, 163 N.W. 984 (1917), and stated at 75 Utah 251, 
284 Pac. 325: 
We are confronted with the situation where the va-
lidity of the conviction is conceded but where the 
sentence is void. In such circumstances it was said 
in State v. Redd supra, a case which presents features 
in all respects essentially the same as the instant 
case: "Only the validity of the sentence is challenged; 
the validity of the conviction is conceded. Where the 
conviction is valid, but the sentence as imposed is void 
either in whole or in part, the weight of modern au-
thority is to the effect that the prisoner cannot secure 
an unconditional discharge upon a writ of habeas 
corpus. 
"If the sentence is valid in part and void in part, and 
the two are not severable, or if it is wholly void be-
cause not such as the court was authorized to impose, 
the prisoner will be remanded for the imposition of a 
lawful sentence." 
Appellant has challenged the imposition of the 
habitual criminal sentence on the grounds that the 
second degree burglary sentence had previously 
been imposed. Appellant argues that this renders 
the imposition of the sentence void as going beyond 
the jurisdiction of the trial court. State v. King. 18 
Wash. 2d 747, 140 P.2d 283 (1943). The logical con-
tinuation of appellant's argument is that when the 
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habitual criminal finding had been made, the trial 
court was mandatorily obligated under the Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-18 (1953) to sentence appellant to 
a minimum term of confinement of fifteen years 
rather than imposing the indeterminate second de-
gree burglary sentence. The argument would be 
that whatever felony is relied on by the state as the 
third felony bringing the defendant within the pur-
view of the habitual criminal statute, the only sen-
tence that could properly be imposed on conviction 
of that third felony would be a sentence for a mini-
mum of fifteen years imprisonment. To allow an in-
determinate sentence on the third felony conviction 
and also an independent sentence on the finding 
of habitual criminality would be invalid because 
habitual criminality is a status and not a crime, State 
v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 2d 45, 347 P.2d 1111, 79 A.L.R.2d 
84 (1960), and a sentence may not be imposed un-
less for a crime. This argument, if sustained, would 
render erroneous both sentences imposed by the 
trial court. 
To avoid circuity of action in the form of yet 
another proceeding and appeal, it is respectfully 
submitted that this court, if appellant's argument is 
sustained, remand this matter to the trial court with 
instructions to impose a senence in conformity with 
the statutes under which the appellant was con-
victed. This sentence would be the imposition of a 
minimum of fifteen years in the Utah State Peniten-
tiary imposed on appellant's conviction of second 
degree burglary as enhanced by the habitual crim-
inal statute. Such a procedure would appear to be 
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in conformity with the dictum contained in State v. 
Zeimer. supra, and Thompson v. Harris. 106 Utah 32, 
144 P.2d 761 (1943). 
It must also be noted that the cases cited in ap-
pellant's brief do not, in fact, support appellant's 
contention. In Kelly v. State. 204 Ind. 512, 185 N.E. 
453 (1933), the Indiana Supreme Court did not dis-
cuss the multiple sentences imposed on the defend-
ant by the trial court. Rather, the court was merely 
answering the defendant's challenges as to the con-
stitutionality of the habitual criminal statute. The 
case was reversed and the defendant was granted 
a new trial for reasons other than the sentences im-
posed by the trial court. In Gameron v. Jones. 148 
Neb. 645, 28 N.W. 2d 403 (1947), the defendant was 
sentenced to two years for chicken stealing, first of-
fense, which was statutorily subject to a one year 
sentence, and to ten years for habitual criminality. 
At the habeas corpus hearing, the trial court held the 
excess of the one year sentence for chicken stealing, 
first offense, void. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
held that the defendant could properly have been 
sentenced to a minimum term of ten years and the 
sentence was erroneous in failing to impose th•:-
statutory minimum term. The court held, however, 
that the sentence was valid to the extent pro-
nounced. Also, in Ex Parte Walt. 73 S.D. 436, 44 
N.W.2d 119 (1950), the South Dakota habitual crim-
inal statute was interpreted in such a manner that 
the imposition the normal statutory penalty or of the 
enhanced penalty was within the discretion of the 
trial court. After that disC'retion had been exercised 
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by the trial court and a sentence was imposed that 
did not reflect the enhanced penalty, error would 
be committed if the valid first sentence was then in-
creased in severity. 
One additional factor of some importance in the 
case at bar is the lack of any prejudice to this de-
fendant resulting from the trial court's pronounce-
ment of sentence. Should this court determine that 
the trial court erred in the sentences imposed on the 
appellant, it must be recognized that this error did 
not prejudice the appellant. The record is clear that 
the Utah State Board of Pardons acted to reduce the 
sentences from consecutive to concurrent terms. 
Such action on the part of the Utah State Board of 
Pardons was within that body's statutory authority. 
State v. Walsh. 106 Utah 22, 144 P.2d 757 (1943); 
Thompson v. Harris. supra. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the sentencing 
procedure employed by the trial court did not vio-
late any constitutionally protected right of the ap-
pellant. However, should this court conclude that 
the imposition of the two sentences by the trial court 
was erroneous, the matter should be remanded for 
proper sentencing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GARY A. FRANK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
